This article models the temporal adoption dynamics of an abstracted Internet technology or service, where the instantaneous net value of the service perceived by each (current or potential) user/customer incorporates three key features: (i) user service affinity heterogeneity, (ii) a network externality, and (iii) a subscription cost. Internet technologies and services with network externalities face a "chicken-and-egg" adoption problem in that the service requires an established customer base to attract new customers. In this article, we study cost subsidization as a means to "reach the knee," at which point the externality drives rapid service adoption, and thereby change the equilibrium service fractional adoption level from an initial near-zero level to a final near-one level (full adoption). We present three simple subsidy models and evaluate them under two natural performance metrics: (i) the duration required for the subsidized service to reach a given target adoption level and (ii) the aggregate cost of the subsidy born by the service provide. First, we present a "two-target adoption subsidy" that subsidizes the cost to keep the fraction of users with positive net utility at a (constant) target level until the actual adoption target is reached. Second, we study a special case of the above where the target ensures all users have positive net utility, corresponding to a "quickest adoption" subsidy (QAS). Third, we introduce an approximation of QAS that only requires the service provider adjust the subsidy level a prescribed number of times. Fourth, we study equilibria and their stability under uniformly and normally distributed user service affinities, highlighting the unstable equilibrium in each case as the natural target adoption level for the provider. Finally, we provide a fictional case study to illustrate the application of the results in a (hopefully) realistic scenario, along with a brief discussion of the limitations of the model and analysis.
INTRODUCTION
With the Internet fueling the rise of a "network society" (Castells 2009 ), many Internet technologies and services 1 realize their value only after reaching a certain level of adoption. In other words, they exhibit positive externalities, for example, Metcalfe's Law. Externalities are well known (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Cabral 1990) to affect service adoption and in particular to create a "chicken-andegg" problem (that is, a service requires customers to attract customers) that can often stymie the success of new services. This is because when a new service is offered, most potential adopters see a cost that exceeds its (low) initial value. This barrier to entry has been used to explain the difficulties encountered by various Internet security protocols (Ozment and Schechter 2006) as well as by new versions of the Internet itself, that is, IPv6 (Guérin and Hosanagar 2010) . Understanding how to overcome this problem is an important challenge for any provider wishing to launch a new service with a network externality. Towards this end, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop on Internet Technology Adoption and Transition (ITAT) in 2013 to "develop protocol deployment strategies that enable new features to rapidly gain a foothold and ultimately realize broad adoption. Such strategies must be informed by both operational and economic factors." 2 In prior work (Weber et al. 2013; ) we investigated service bundling as a means of overcoming initial adoption inertia. In this work, we analyze the service adoption dynamics (AD) under a standard diffusion model when the service provider employs cost subsidization. The model used in both our prior work and in this article has in common three key assumptions (see Section 2, Assumption 1): (i) users are heterogeneous, that is, their affinity for the service varies; (ii) services exhibit positive externalities, that is, the utility perceived by a user is an increasing function of the service adoption level; and (iii) services have a subscription cost, that is, a user pays a fixed amount per unit time to participate in the service. There are neither additional costs to join the service nor any contractual requirements that prevent leaving the service at any time. The per-user cost is assumed to be non-discriminatory, that is, identical across users, and fixed (exogenous).
This article is an extension of prior work on cost subsidization under diffusion AD. That article studied a constant subsidy under a uniform affinity distribution, and the main result was an expression for the subsidy duration and aggregate cost. The key improvements of this article relative to include (i) generalization of the model to an arbitrary affinity distribution; (ii) introduction and analysis of three new subsidy models ("two-target adoption subsidy" (TTAS), "quickest adoption" subsidy (QAS), and an approximation of QAS (AQAS)); (iii) analysis of the equilibria and associated stability for general affinity distributions, with thorough analysis of the uniform and normal case; (iv) a case study illustrating the applicability of the results; and (v) a brief study of the impact of nonlinear externalities.
Related Work
Subsidization is a natural solution for such services because it incentivizes adoption among initial adopters ("innovators" (Bass 1969) ), thereby allowing the adoption level to build up to the "knee," that is, the point at which the strength of the externality will incentivize the later adopters ("imitators"), and the subsidy will no longer be needed to sustain the service. Subsidization may take many forms; we provide a (necessarily) selective and brief review of this large topic below.
There is a long-standing awareness of the role of subsidies in realizing more efficient outcomes in "markets" that exhibit positive externalities, that is, by demonstrating the benefits of Pigouvian subsidies (Pigou 1920) . For example, Chacko and Mitchell (1998) examines the impact of early investments on a firm's growth rate in the telecommunication industry. It identifies that early investments can facilitate the creation of an initial user base and lead to greater overall market share. This awareness not withstanding, most of the focus to date has been on case studies, for example, see McIntyre and Subramaniam (2009) for a recent review.
There have been some recent efforts on the modeling front, stemming in part from interest in viral marketing in online (social) networks (Candogan et al. 2012; Hartline et al. 2008; Swapna et al. 2012; Ajorlou et al. 2014 ). These works are closely related to studies of adoption dynamics in social networks (Kleinberg 2007, Chapter 24) but with a focus on maximizing revenue rather than adoption. The optimal marketing strategy in a symmetric network, that is, a product utility grows in proportion to its number of adopters, is investigated in Hartline et al. (2008) by formulating it as the solution of a dynamic program. A general network setting is considered in Candogan et al. (2012) with the important difference of considering a divisible good, so consumption maximization is the goal. Although we consider a common cost to users, we note that multiclass (Paris Metro) pricing for heterogeneous users is addressed in Chau et al. (2014) . Finally, Courcoubetis et al. (2016) considers pricing for users with heterogeneous affinities, which in their context takes the form of user and subscriber loyalty to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Content Service Providers (CSPs); this issue is also addressed in Cho et al. (2016) .
Like Bass (1969) , we focus on product adoption among heterogeneous users in the presence of an externality, but our work differs in that Bass (1969) studies two classes with no adoption costs and no subsidization. Like Katz and Shapiro (1986) , we focus on subsidies (sponsorship in their article) with externalities, but our work differs in that Katz and Shapiro (1986) looks at equilibrium pricing, whereas our interest is on adoption dynamics. Like Hartline et al. (2008) , we address optimizing over subsidies, but Hartline et al. (2008) considers buyer-specific subsidies and externalities.
Finally, we comment on the past and current role that subsidies have played in the adoption of Internet technologies and services. A survey of network economics is given in Shy (2011) . One of the first and most influential articles establishing the connection between computer security and economics as a whole is Anderson (2001) (cf. Anderson and Moore (2007) ); the author, Ross Anderson, founded the annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) in 2001, dedicated to exploring this connection (cf. Schneier (2006) ) and maintains the "Economics and Security Resource Page" (Anderson 2016) . As discussed in Ozment and Schechter (2006) , the U.S. Department of Homeland Security subsidized open source software development for the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) as a means of facilitating its adoption. A few years later, Clayton (2010) proposed government subsidize the cost of removing malware from end-user computers. More recently, with the rise of social networks, subsidies are now a standard tool; the example of the smart phone application ride-sharing service Lyft is discussed in Edelman (2015) . The subscription subsidy models used in startup dating websites are discussed in Wendel (2015) .
Contributions and Outline
Section 2 introduces the basic mathematical model, with a justification of the model assumptions in Section 2.1, and an analysis of the special case of a service with no externality in Section 2.2. Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.5 establish the uniqueness of the adoption equilibrium in this case. Although it is not the only plausible scenario, it is natural for a service provider to consider using a subsidy in a situation with multiple stable equilibria, where the low initial service adoption level will result in unsubsidized adoption dynamics converging to the lower equilibrium, but a sufficiently strong subsidy may push the adoption level high enough to enable convergence to the higher equilibrium. In contrast, multiple stable equilibria are possible with externalities; it is for this reason we believe it is most natural to study the use of subsidies for services exhibiting externalities, which we assume for the rest of the article. Our two figures of merit are the subsidy duration and the aggregate cost of the subsidy born by the provider (Definition 2.3), that is, the 38:4 S. Weber instantaneous aggregate subsidy cost (the product of the subsidy per user times the number of users) integrated over the subsidy duration.
Section 3 introduces the TTAS, where the subsidy is structured to maintain a constant fraction of users with positive net utility until such time as the target adoption level is achieved. We first establish a necessary condition for a subsidy to be extremal with respect to aggregate cost (Proposition 3.1 in Section 3.1) and then show (Proposition 3.4 in Section 3.2) that the TTAS satisfies this condition; however, there is no reason to suspect TTAS is optimal. The aggregate cost of a TTAS (Proposition 3.5) shown in Figure 3 demonstrates the two key performance metrics, the aggregate cost and the subsidy duration, may or may not be in tension with each other, depending on parameters.
Section 4 specializes the TTAS to the case when the subsidy is structured so all users have positive net utility, which we term a QAS. We establish the nature of the aggregate cost of a QAS as a function of the target adoption level (Proposition 4.2 in Section 4.1) and identify parameter regimes where the subsidy cost is always positive, always negative, and admits a finite maximum, respectively ( Figure 4 ). As TTAS (and thus QAS) impose the possibly unrealistic requirement that the provider instantaneously adjust the subsidy in response to the adoption level, we introduce the AQAS in Section 4.2, wherein the provider sets a sequence of intermediate adoption levels and adjusts the subsidy amount in a piecewise constant manner. We give the aggregate cost of AQAS (Proposition 4.5) as a function of these target parameters and study the cost of AQAS over QAS in Figure 6 .
As shown in Section 5, until now the target adoption level has been chosen exogenously, independent of the equilibria of the unsubsidized adoption dynamics. The natural context for subsidization of services with externalities, however, is to use the subsidy to bootstrap the adoption of the service to reach a critical adoption level, at which point the externality is sufficiently strong to drive the adoption level to a high adoption level without subsidization. Such a strategy, however, requires knowledge of the set of equilibria, their stability, and their dependence on the three key model parameters: the affinity distribution, the nominal service cost, and the externality. Section 5 gives (i) the number of possible equilibria for a general affinity distribution (Proposition 5.1 in Section 5.1) and (ii) a detailed investigation of the equilibria and adoption dynamics under uniformly (Section 5.2) and normally (Section 5.3) distributed affinities, respectively.
In Section 6, a fictional case study is presented with the intention of illustrating the applicability of the preceding content in a plausible scenario of a mobile app/service startup. First, the idealized continuous-time AD for an infinite population is shown (in Appendix B) to connect with the more pragmatic discrete-time AD for a finite population. Second, the startup holds a trial period with a certain structure to estimate key model parameters such as the externality and the user affinity distribution; it is shown that these quantities can in fact be estimated. Third, the startup evaluates a suite of possible subsidies, namely constant subsidies and the three subsidies discussed above (TTAS, QAS, and AQAS), and simulation results demonstrate their performance.
Section 7 offers a brief discussion of the limitations anticipated in applying the model and the analysis to real-world scenarios. Section 8 presents a brief conclusion.
There are two appendices. In Appendix A, we briefly investigate nonlinear externalities, since elsewhere we have assumed a linear externality per user, consistent with the quadratic sum-user utility growth of Metcalfe's law. Appendix B presents several longer proofs.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
This section provides the basic mathematical model for the paper. Notation is summarized in Table 1 . 
Assumptions and Justifications
Let x (t ) = x (t |t, x ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of the population that has adopted the service at each time t ≥ t subject to the initial condition x (t ) = x. The model captures AD in a large population of potential users of an Internet service exhibiting the assumptions in Section 1, formalized as Assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1.
(1) The net utility, V = V (x, u), perceived by a randomly selected user when the adoption level is x, the subsidized service cost is c − u, and the externality parameter is e, is the ran-
where A is the random user affinity for the service, and ν (x, u) ≡ (c − u) − ex is the user net cost. (2) User service affinity heterogeneity is captured by the random variable A, with a continuous complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)F A (a) ≡ P(A > a). Affinities are independent and identically distributed (iid).
(3) The service externality is captured by the term ex, where e ≥ 0 is the externality parameter.
We generalize this from (linear) x to nonlinear κ (x ) in Appendix A. (4) The subsidized cost of adoption is c − u, where c ≥ 0 is a constant representing the nominal cost, and u ∈ R is the subsidy amount. Observe that (i) u < 0 corresponds to a negative subsidy (an increased service cost), where users pay more than the nominal cost, and (ii) u > c corresponds to a negative cost, where the provider in fact pays users to join the service. We write both u (x ) to represent a subsidy as a function of the state x and u (t ) to represent a subsidy as a function of time t, with the intepretation clear from context. Setting u = 0 corresponds to unsubsidized dynamics.
38:6 S. Weber (5) The adoption level follows standard diffusion dynamics (Mahajan and Peterson 1985, Chapter 1, Equation 1 ), with timescale parameter γ > 0:
where the (positive or negative) net utility at adoption level x and subsidy level u is
Remark 2.1. Each of the five points in the above assumption are given a corresponding justification below.
(1) Each of the three terms in V (x, u) and ν (x, u), namely A, c − u, and ex, reflects one of the key assumptions in Section 1. Linear utility models like V (x, u) are standard in the network externality literature (for example, (Bass 1969; Candogan et al. 2012) ), although more general models have been studied (for example, (Cabral 1990) ). Note that the net utility, and each of the three terms comprising it, represent values or costs per unit time.
(2) User affinity heterogeneity in the target population is central to the use of diffusion dynamics in Equation (2); a homogeneous population with fixed affinity a results in the trivial case where the entire population has positive (negative) net utility for x ≷ (c − u − a)/e, respectively. The iid assumption is valid in many populations but is also required for tractability.
(3) Metcalfe's "Law," which asserts that the sum utility over all users of a network service grows in the square of the size of the user base, means the utility per user grows linearly, consistent with the ex form of the externality in Assumptions 1-3, where e is the linear growth rate. Metcalfe's Law is assumed in much, but not all, of the literature on adoption under externalities. Other dependencies have been argued as more suitable (Briscoe et al. 2006 ); we study this (briefly) in Appendix A. (4) The instantaneous subsidized subscription cost c − u focuses our model on services where the provider charges each user a regular fee to participate (for example, World of Warcraft or Angie's List 3 ). Although one can define an equivalent model with A = A − c, we retain c to facilitate investigation of cost subsidization u. (5) The dynamics in Equation (2) assert the rate of change of the adoption level is proportional to the difference between the fraction of the population that would adopt at adoption level x (t ), and the fraction of the population that has adopted, that is, x (t ). This principle, admitting a wide class of variants, is standard in the literature, (Rogers 1962; Bass 1969; Moore 1991) .
Equilibria and stability are defined for unsubsidized AD, since they are asymptotic (in time) quantities, and we focus in this work on finite-duration subsidies.
An equilibrium occurs when all users with positive (negative) net utility have (not) adopted the service.
We presume the service provider has in mind a target adoption level, denotedx, withx ∈ (x, 1]. We consider the class of continuous controls, denoted U, with each control u ∈ U representing a subsidy, for which the adoption level x is driven to the target adoption levelx by some finite timē t[u] > t, that is, x (t[u]) =x. Following convention, we place the function argument of functionals in square brackets, as int [u] . Although it is clear from the definitions of V (x, u) and ν (x, u) that u depends essentially on the state x, rather than on the time t, we nonetheless alternately denote u = (u (t ), t ∈ [t,t]) as a function of time, and u = (u (x ), x ∈ [x,x]) as a function of the state. We emphasize thatx is exogenous, but nott. We consider two metrics by which we assess the performance of the subsidy: the hitting time,t [u] , and the aggregate provider cost J [u], both of which, naturally, are to be minimized.
Definition 2.3. The aggregate cost of a subsidy born by the provider for a subsidy function u with induced adoption level x over the duration [t,t[u] 
( 3) where for l (x, u) ≡ xu the instantaneous aggregate cost to the provider when subsidy level u is applied and the adoption level is x. Changing variables from t to
Multiplying J [u] by γ as above makes the aggregate cost independent of γ , and we will often report results in this way.
Subsidies without Externalities
In this section, we study the impact of subsidization in the absence of an externality (e = 0), so the subsidized utility is
Proposition 2.4. In the absence of an externality (e = 0) and subsidization (u = 0) (2) has solution
The AD with subsidization u = (u (t ), t ∈ [t,t]) that depends on time t and not on the adoption level x (but is otherwise arbitrary) has solution
for t ≤t. For t >t, the AD are x (t ) = x (t |t,χ ) for x (t ) in Equation (5) andχ = x (t |t, x ) the adoption level at the end of the subsidy at timet.
Proof. With no subsidization the AD (2) areẋ (t ) = γ f (x (t ), 0), and the solution is obtained by separation of variables. With the subsidy u the AD areẋ (t ) = γ f (x (t ), u (t )), and the solution is obtained by integrating factors.
The importance of this proposition is that it immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. In the absence of an externality (e = 0), the unique equilibrium of both the unsubsidized and subsidized AD in Proposition 2.4 is X = {F A (c)}.
Example 2.6. To illustrate Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.5, fix t = x = e = 0, γ = 1, and c = 1/2 and suppose affinities are uniformly distributed, that is, A ∼ Uni(0, 1). Figure 1 shows the AD x (t ) vs. t under a constant subsidy u with u (t ) = c for t ∈ [0,t] andt ∈ {0, 1/2, 1, 3/2, ∞}. After the subsidy ends, the AD converge to the equilibrium,F A (c) = 1/2. Remark 2.7. In the absence of an externality, the resulting unique (stable) equilibriumX = {F A (c)} means that any finite-time subsidy cannot alter the final equilibrium level. In the presence of an externality, however, the final equilibrium level is (in some cases) alterable by a finite-term 38:8 S. Weber Fig. 1 . Example 2.6 (Section 2.2). The AD x (t ) vs. t for no externality (e = 0), with A ∼ Uni[0, 1], and full subsidy with u (t ) = c = 1/2 over t ≤t, witht ∈ {0, 1/2, 1, 3/2, ∞}. As soon as the subsidy ends, the adoption level begins converging to the sole equilibriumF A (c) = 1/2. subsidy (see Section 5.2 and Section 5.3). In summary, subsidies are ineffective in the absence of an externality and will be shown to be an effective and natural control mechanism when one is present.
TWO-TARGET ADOPTION SUBSIDIES
In this section, we first use Euler's equation (from the calculus of variations) to establish a necessary condition for a subsidy to be cost extremal in Section 3.1, and then we introduce the class of two-target adoption subsidies and establish them as extremal in Section 3.2.
A Necessary Condition for Cost-extremal Subsidies
The following proposition gives a necessary condition for a subsidy to extremal 4 with respect to J [u] in (3). 
Proof. We require only an elementary result in the calculus of variations. In particular, we use (Gelfand and Fomin 1963, Theorem 2) (cf. the subsequent Remark 1) giving a necessary condition for u to be extremal in the presence of "finite subsidiary conditions," also called non-holonomic constraints, that is, д(ẋ, x, u) = 0, in our case given by д (ẋ, x, u) =ẋ − γ f (x, u) . In particular, the theorem states that if u is extremal for J [u] under д = 0, then there exists a function λ (defined above) such that u is extremal for
The Euler equations forJ
is the user affinity PDF, into the Euler equations gives
Solving for u gives Equation (7).
The following subsection establishes a class of subsidies that satisfy this condition.
Two-target Adoption Subsidies
We propose a subsidy family, termed the TTAS family, with parameter χ ∈ (x, 1], where the subsidy is structured such that the fraction of users with positive net utility is kept constant at χ , that
It is clear from Equation (2) that χ ≥x is necessary and sufficient to ensure x reachesx. If the subsidy were to be continued indefinitely beyond its terminal timet [u] , then x → χ as t → ∞, so χ is also the asymptotic adoption level.
Definition 3.2. Given a target adoption levelx > x, the TTAS with parameter χ ∈ (x, 1] and
which obeys ν (x, u (x )) = ρ andF A (ν (x, u (x ))) = χ , and thus, by Equation (2)
The name two-target is apt, because one may think of this subsidy as "aiming" for the "inflated" target χ >x, but stopping once the actual targetx is achieved. Observe the subsidy u is linearly decreasing in the adoption level x, which accords with the intuition that larger subsidies are appropriate for lower adoption levels and can be decreased, eliminated, and even made negative at higher adoption levels, where the externality strength offsets the higher cost without negatively affecting net utility.
Remark 3.3. Recall Assumption 1 Point 4. Observe u < 0, that is, the subsidy in fact increases the nominal cost from c to c − u > c, when x > (c − ρ)/e. As x ∈ [x,x], it follows that these cost increases will occur at some point over the course of the subsidy ifx > (c − ρ)/e. Next, observe u > c, that is, the subsidy in fact reduces the nominal cost to below 0, meaning the provider in fact pays users to subscribe, when x < −ρ/e, which can only happen if ρ < 0. These negative costs will occur over the course of the subsidy if x < −ρ/e. The more typical scenario of a "partial subsidy,"
Proposition 3.4. The TTAS with parameter χ ∈ (x, 1] satisfies the necessary condition from Proposition 3.1 to be extremal for J [u] . The terminal timet [u] , the adoption level x, the subsidy u, and the Lagrange multiplier function λ are (recall ρ = ρ (χ )):
We emphasize that although the TTAS satisfies the necessary condition for extremality, there is no cause to believe the TTAS is itself optimal.
Proof. The necessary condition u = ex − γ λ from Proposition 3.1 for a subsidy to be cost extremal combined with the TTAS equation u = c − ρ − ex from Definition 3.2 has solution
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which highlights the symmetry between (x, u). Asẋ = γ (χ − x ) under the TTAS, it follows that the dynamics are given by Proposition 2.4, but with χ replacingF A (c). That is, although Equation (5) holds for e = 0 and u = 0, it applies also in this case, since the TTAS ensuresF A = χ . The expression fort [u] follows by solving
The quantities x, u, λ, l (x, u) are shown in Figure 2 . Observe the inverse relationship between x, u is such that the instantaneous cost l (x, u) has a global maximum at some time t ∈ (t,t ). In particular, for t near t the provider pays a large subsidy, but only to a few users, for a moderate aggregate instantaneous cost, while for t neart, the provider pays a very small subsidy to a much larger number of users for a moderate aggregate instantaneous cost. In fact, for χ small (here, χ = 4/5), we see a negative instantaneous cost (l < 0) for t > 2, meaning the provider raises the cost above c to extract revenue; the strength of the externality at a high adoption level offsets this high cost to keep the fraction of users with net positive utility at χ .
The TTAS has the additional benefit that its aggregate cost can be expressed succinctly, as given in the following result.
Proposition 3.5. The TTAS has aggregate cost
where ξ (χ ) ≡ (c − ρ (χ ))/e and τ (χ ) ≡ log
, and thus, by Equation (4) 
from which integration and algebra yields Equation (15). Figure 3 . Several points bear mention. The qualitative behavior of J [u] as a function of χ varies dramatically for variousx, ranging from convex decreasing for smallx, convex with internal minimum for moderatex, and increasing for larger x. The corresponding J -optimal χ * is therefore highly sensitive tox even for fixed (c, e). Roughly speaking, χ * = 1 (quickest adoption) is J -optimal for smallx, while χ * =x (slowest adoption) is J -optimal for largerx. In fact, J may even be negative, that is, the provider earns a net profit from the subsidy, whenx is large and χ * is sufficiently close tox. The subsidy durationt is naturally decreasing in χ for eachx, and increasing inx. The performance plot of achievable (J ,t ) pairs, with χ as a parameter, shows that for smallx there is no tension between J andt (they can both be minimized by selecting a large χ ), while for largex the two are in tension. In particular, the provider may profit from the subsidy (J < 0) but at the expense of a larger adoption timet.
Plots of the aggregate cost
On account of the complicated nature of J for the TTAS, and on account of its natural interest, we investigate in the next section the special case when χ = 1.
QUICKEST ADOPTION SUBSIDIES
In this section, we specialize the TTAS family to the special case of χ = 1, which corresponds to minimizingt [u] and which we therefore refer to as a QAS. As evident from Figure 3 , such a subsidy may or may not be optimal with regard to aggregate cost J [u] . A QAS is natural from the perspective of the the service provider interested in achieving the target adoption levelx as soon as possible. In this section, we first establish some properties of aggregate cost of the QAS as a function of the targetx in Section 4.1 and then present an approximate QAS in Section 4.2.
Properties of the QAS
Quickest adoption is achievable by finite-cost subsidies under the assumption below.
Assumption 2. There exists a finite minimum service affinity ρ withF A (ρ) = 1.
The rationale behind this assumption is that it ensures ρ (χ ) is finite at χ = 1, and therefore u under the TTAS is finite, as the following definition makes clear. Observe the normal affinities used in Figure 2 and Figure 3 do not satisfy this assumption. 
We view the target adoption levelx as the parameter of interest for a QAS and establish properties of the aggregate cost J [u] as a function ofx in the following proposition.
where ξ (1) = (c − ρ)/e and τ (1) ≡ log Proof. Specializing Proposition 3.5 to χ = 1 yields Equation (17). The two derivatives are
The three regimes follow by the signs of the two derivatives as a function ofx.
Remark 4.3. The condition ξ (1) ≤ x is equivalent to ρ + ex − c ≥ 0, which is easily seen to also denote the condition that the lowest possible net utility in the absence of subsidiziation, that is, V satisying V ≥ V almost surely, is nonnegative (since V ≡ ρ − ν (x, 0)). Thus ξ (1) < x represents a service where the entire set of potential users has a positive net utility at all adoption levels x ≥ x without subsidization. The condition ξ (1) ≥ 1 is equivalent to ρ + e1 − c ≤ 0, which asserts that the maximum utility (over x) of the minimum affinity user is negative in the absence of subsidization. Thus, the service provider desiring quickest adoption dynamics must always subsidize the service, even at near-full adoption where the externality is strongest, to ensure the lowest affinity users have positive net utility. Figure 4 illustrates the three behaviors from Proposition 4.2. The curve for ξ (1) ∈ [x, 1] is positive (negative) forx < x r (x > x r ), meaning the provider incurs a net cost for moderate target adoption levels but reaps a net profit for higher adoption levels. The difference is on account of the provider being able to recoup incurred expenses in jumpstarting the adoption of the service once the externality at high adoption levels allows the use of a negative subsidy while preserving the quickest adoption property.
Approximate QAS
The TTAS, including the special case of QAS, has the drawback of requiring the provider instantaneously adjust the subsidy amount to track the adoption level, according to u (x (t )) = c − ρ − ex (t ). This may be unrealizable or undesirable for practical service deployments, which motivates the following discussion of approximate QAS, hereafter denoted AQAS, where u is updated discretely at each of k target intermediate adoption levels.
Definition 4.4. The AQAS with parameters (x, w ) employs k intermediate targets w = (w 1 , . . . ,w k ), where x = w 0 < w 1 < · · · < w k < w k+1 =x. The subsidy is set according toũ (x ) = u i (x ) , where i (x ) = (k + 1)x ∈ [k + 1] is the index at adoption level, x, · is the ceiling function, and the vector (ũ 1 , . . . ,ũ k+1 ) has components
As illustrated in Figure 5 , the AQAS subsidy scheduleũ (x ) is a piecewise-constant function of x that is equal to the actual QAS subsidy schedule u (x ) at points w i , for i ∈ {0, . . . , k }, and exceeds u (x ) at all other points. The key property of the approximate schedule is that the excess subsidy ensures positive net utility for all potential users and therefore quickest adoption. That is,ũ (
In essence, the AQAS incurs an additional aggregate cost in exchange for a simpler subsidy schedule. Proposition 4.5 gives the aggregate cost of an AQAS. 
where J (w ) = γ e J [u] emphasizes the dependence on w. The necessary condition for w to be extremal, ∇J (w ) = 0, is the system of k equations
and as such J (w ) is convex for k = 1.
Proof. Substituteũ (x ) into Equation (4) and rearrange as Equation (20):
The gradient ∇J (w ) and Hessian are obtained by differentiation of Equations (20) and (21), respectively. The convexity for k = 1 follows from the sign of ∂ 2 ∂w 2 i J (w ).
Remark 4.6. Numerical investigation suggests J (w ) is in fact convex in w for general k, not just k = 1, but we have thus far been unable to prove this. The well-known sufficient condition for 38:14 S. Weber convexity (that is, positive definiteness of ∇ 2 J (w )) is to establish that ∇ 2 J (w ) is diagonally dominant and apply the Gershgorin circle theorem. Unfortunately, ∇ 2 J (w ) is not diagonally dominant, as may be seen for the case k = 2:
Diagonal dominance for the first row requires
but the latter is false for, for example, (x, w 1 , w 2 ) = (0, 1/2, 4/7), where the right side is −2/7.
For k = 1 the convexity of the AQAS aggregate cost in the intermediate target w 1 may be understood as follows (recall Figure 4 ). If w 1 is near x and far fromx, then the first subsidy level u (x ) = c − ρ − ex holds for a smaller range of x, but the second subsidy levelũ (x ) = c − ρ − ew 1 holds for a larger range of x, and the reverse is true for w 1 near tox and far from x. The optimal w * 1 makes the best tradeoff among these two costs. Selecting w * 1 as a function of (x,x ) via Equation (21), yields an optimized AQAS scheduleũ * , with optimized (normalized) cost (bottom) is the aggregate cost inefficiency of the optimized AQAS relative to that of QAS. The inefficiency is increasing inx for any ξ (1).
AFFINITIES AND THEIR EQUILIBRIA
While optimizing the target adoption levelx for QAS and AQAS to minimize cost is a natural objective, the discussion thus far has not incorporated the equilibria associated with the unsubsidized dynamics. In particular, if the targetx lies in the domain of attraction for a stable equilibria much lower thanx, then the adoption level will immediately begin converging towards that point as soon as the subsidy is terminated, thereby "undoing" the forward progress achieved via the subsidy. The natural use of the subsidy in the context of services exhibiting externalities is to use the subsidy to "jump start" the adoption to reach the boundary of the domain of attraction for the desired adoption level, such that, on termination of the subsidy, the strength of the externality Fig. 7 . Illustration of Proposition 5.1. The six cases represent the six orderings of (x 1 , x 2 ,F 1 ,F 2 ). Each case showsF A (ν (x, 0)), both convex (green) and concave (gold), over
will maintain or increase the adoption level. Such an objective requires knowledge of the set of equilibria, whether or not each equilibrium is stable, and how the equilibria depend on the key model parameters: the nominal cost c, the externality parameter e, and the affinity distributionF A . We study this question for generalF A in Section 5.1, the uniform distribution in Section 5.2, and the normal distribution in Section 5.3.
General Affinities
The support, say, A, of any continuous affinity distribution,F A , is an (possibly infinite) interval, which may be partitioned into k sub-intervals, say, A 1 , . . . , A k , such thatF A is alternately convex and concave on successive intervals. Proposition 5.1, illustrated in Figure 7 , enumerates the number of equilibria, defined in Definition 2.2, found in sub-interval A k .
Consider x 1 , x 2 , with 0 ≤ x 1 < x 2 ≤ 1, as defining an interval [x 1 , x 2 ] of interest on the set of possible adoption levels [0, 1]. Next, defineF 1 ,F 2 , with 0 ≤F 1 <F 2 ≤ 1, whereF 1 =F A (ν (x 1 , 0)) and F 2 =F A (ν (x 2 , 0)), and recallF A (ν (x, 0)) represents the fraction of users with positive net affinity in the absence of subsidies, that is, u = 0. Observe (i)F A (a) is a decreasing function of a, butF A (ν (x, 0)) is an increasing function of x, and (ii) ifF A (a) is convex (concave) in a over [ν (x 2 , 0), ν (x 1 , 0)], then
Proposition 5.1. Consider an adoption interval [x 1 , x 2 ] such that the corresponding affinity interval [ν (x 2 , 0), ν (x 1 , 0)] is contained entirely in one of the sub-intervals A k ofF A , and let [F 1 ,F 2 ] be the corresponding target adoption interval. There are six possible orderings of the intervals [x 1 , x 2 ] and [F 1 ,F 2 ], enumerated below, and, by construction,F A (ν (x, 0)) is either convex or concave in x over [x 1 , x 2 ]. Then the number of equilibria in that interval, each solvingF A (ν (x, 0) 38:16
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The first column is a case label, the next four columns identify the ordering of {x 1 , x 2 ,F 1 ,F 2 }, and the last two columns indicate the number of solutions whenF A (ν (x, 0)) is concave (∩) or convex (∪) in x over [x 1 , x 2 ], respectively.
Proof. The proof is essentially by picture. Case (i) and (vi) are trivial. Cases (iii) and (iv) are similar; consider case (iii). By Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, there exists at least one solution. SupposeF A (ν (x, 0) ) is concave in x, and let x * denote the smallest element in the set of solutions. This ensures x * is the unique solution, sinceF A (ν (x, 0) ) lies above the chord connecting (x * , x * ) and (x 2 ,F 2 ), and this chord lies above the chord connecting (x * , x * ) and (x 2 , x 2 ), and thus there can be no solutions in [x * , x 2 ]. SupposeF A (ν (x, 0) ) is convex in x, and let x * denote the largest element in the set of solutions. This ensures that x * is the unique solution, sinceF A (ν (x, 0) ) lies below the chord connecting (x 1 , x 1 ) and (x * , x * ), and this chord lies below the chord connecting (x 1 , x 1 ) and (x * , x * ), and thus there is no solution in [x 1 , x * ].
Cases (ii) and (v) are similar; consider case (ii). IfF A (ν (x, 0) ) is convex in x, then there are no equilibria in [x 1 , x 2 ], sinceF A (ν (x, 0)) lies below the chord connecting (x 1 ,F 1 ) and (x 2 ,F 2 ), and this chord lies below the chord connecting (x 1 , x 1 ) and (x 2 , x 2 ). Suppose next F U is concave. Similar arguments establish the set of equilibria to be either 0 or 2 whenF A (ν (x, 0)) is concave in x.
Although the number of equilibria within each subinterval A k of A is between zero and 2, there is no limit on the number of such intervals for an arbitrary distributionF A , and as such it is difficult to develop a general theory. We therefore address the concrete examples of uniform and normal affinities in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, respectively.
Uniform Affinities
In this subsection, we suppose there exists a,ā with a ≤ā and that user affinities are uniformly distributed over [a,ā] , that is, A ∼ Uni [a,ā] . Let W ∼ Uni[0, 1] be a standard uniform random variable with CCDFF W (w ). We (i) characterize the set of equilibria X and stable equilibriaX and (ii) explicitly solve the unsubsidized (u = 0) AD x (t ) in Equation (2).
Specializing the general AD (2) to the uniformly distributed affinities, standardizing A via W = (A − a)/(ā − a) ∼ Uni[0, 1], and writing c for c and e for e yields f (x, 0)
where c = (c − a)/(ā − a) and e = e /(ā − a). Thus, there is no loss in generality in restriction to the case a = 0 andā = 1, since, for any (c , e , a,ā) tuple, the model (c, e, 0, 1) is equivalent. Because of this equivalence, we henceforth assume A ∼ Uni[0, 1]. Our first result gives the equilibria X (Definition 2.2) as a function of (e, c), shown in Figure 8 . The (unstable) equilibria x • below is, when x • ∈ (0, 1), the boundary between the domains of attraction to the stable equilibria at 0 and 1:
Proposition 5.2. The equilibria under uniform affinities are Besides these main cases, there are "edge cases":
Proof. See the far left of Figure 8 . From Definition 2.2, X are the x-coordinates of the intersections ofF W (w ) and the line segment (c − w )/e on the (w, x ) plane. As the adoption level x obeys 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, it follows that c − e ≤ w ≤ c. It is clear that X ∅ for all (e, c). There are four cases for this intersection, as shown in the figure.
Definet
as the time durations required to reach (c − 1)/e and c/e, respectively, starting from x, assuming such times are finite.
Proposition 5.3. The AD under uniform affinities when 1 < c < e (case 3) are
(31)
The first (last) three subcases hold for x ≶ x • , so x 3 (t ) → 0 (1) as t → ∞, respectively.
The AD for the remaining three cases from Proposition 5.2 are in Proposition B.1 in Appendix B, which also contains the proof of Proposition 5.3. Figure 9 illustrates the AD for all four cases.
Remark 5.4. As cases 1, 2, and 4 have only one equilibrium, there is no possibility for a finiteduration subsidy to change the equilibrium adoption level. By contrast, such a change is possible under case 3 (whereX = {0, 1}) provided the initial adoption level x lies below the boundary x • between the two domains of attraction of the two stable equilibria, 0 and 1, that is, x < (>) x • ensures x (t ) → 0 (1), respectively, as t → ∞. This boundary is the natural target adoption level, 38:18 S. Weber Fig. 9. (Section 5. 2) The AD x (t |t, x ) vs. t (with t = 0 and x ∈ {1/10, 1/3, 2/3, 9/10}) under uniform affinities for the four cases in Proposition 5.3 and Proposition B.1. The only case with multiple equilibria is case 3. that is,x = x • , for a subsidy, since the strength of the externality at adoption level above x • will henceforth drive the adoption level towards one without requiring a subsidy.
Normal Affinities
Now let affinities be normally distributed, A ∼ N (μ, σ ), and first introduce some notation. Let Q (z) ≡ P(Z > z) be the CCDF of Z ∼ N (0, 1) a standard normal, Q −1 (q) its inverse, q(z) ≡ d dz Q (z) the standard normal PDF, and
the (positive) inverse of q(z) for p ∈ (0, 1/ √ 2π ], that is, z = q −1 (p) > 0 obeys q(z) = p. We now show that it suffices to consider A ∼ N (0, 1) . Suppose c , e are the nominal cost and externality. Then, via Equation (2), standardizing A into Z via Z = (A − μ)/σ , and defining c = (c − μ)/σ and e = e /σ , we obtain:
Thus there is no loss in generality in restricting attention to the case μ = 0 and σ = 1, since, for any (c , e , μ, σ ) tuple, we can obtain an equivalent model (c, e, 0, 1). Because of this equivalence, we henceforth assume A ∼ N (0, 1). Although we will give our results in terms of the adoption level x, it is often simpler to work with the linear reparameterization z = c − ex, withż = −eẋ. Our first result is on the number of equilibria as a function of (e, c), shown in Figure 10 . Define, for e > √ 2π , c l (e) ≡ eQ (q −1 (1/e)) + q −1 (1/e), c u (e) ≡ e (1 − Q (q −1 (1/e))) − q −1 (1/e). 
Proposition 5.5. The equilibria set X for normally distributed affinities has cardinality: (i) |X| = 3 for e > √ 2π and c ∈ (c l (e), c u (e)), (ii) |X| = 2 for e > √ 2π and c ∈ {c l (e), c u (e)}, and (iii) |X| = 1 otherwise.
The proof is in Appendix B. The functions c l (e), c u (e), δ (e) in Equations (34) and (35) are unbounded as e → ∞, with c l (e) growing approximately like 2 log(e), and c u (e), δ (e) growing approximately linearly in e for e large. As such, for any e > 0 and sufficiently large c, we recover |X| = 1. Likewise, for any c > 0 and sufficiently large e, we recover |X| = 1.
Although it is difficult to explicitly and analytically characterize the exact values of the equilibria X for an arbitrary point on the (e, c) plane, the observations below follow from Figure 15, Figure 10 , and the proof of Proposition 5.5. Below, the equilibria are numbered asx 1 ,x 1 <x 2 , andx 1 <x 2 < x 3 , for the three cases |X| ∈ {1, 2, 3}, respectively.
(1) There always exists at least one stable equilibrium.
(2) At (e, c) = ( √ 2π , √ π /2),x 1 = 1/2. (4) For any (e, 0),x 1 = 1 sinceż(t ) < 0, ensuring z(t ) → c − e. (5) For any (e, c l (e)),x 1 is stable andx 2 = Q (q −1 (1/e)) is unstable, and for any (e, c u (e)),x 1 = 1 − Q (q −1 (1/e)) is unstable andx 2 is stable. (6) For any (e, c) with c l (e) < c < c u (e), equilibriax 1 ,x 3 are stable andx 2 is unstable, with
x 1 < Q (q −1 (1/e)) <x 2 < 1 − Q (q −1 (1/e)) <x 3 . (7) For any e, lim c→∞x1 = 0, and lim c→0x1 is the unique solution to Q (z) = −z/e, which is increasing in e. (8) For any c, lim e→∞x1 = 1 and lim e→0x1 = Q (c).
These observations are presented in Figure 10 , which shows the numerically computed equilibria on the (e, c) plane. Numerically computed AD are shown in Figure 11 .
A CASE STUDY
The discrete-time finite-population AD below are motivated by the model discussion in Appendix B (see proof for notation). If the fraction x t of the finite population of size N adopting the service in slot t is governed by the dynamics described in Appendix B, then
The above AD are an accurate approximation of the continuous-time infinite-population AD in Equation (1) for large N and small time slot duration h, as discussed in Appendix B.
38:20
S. Weber
The following is a fictional example/case study intended to illustrate a potential application of the preceding content in a (hopefully) realistic scenario. Inspired by recent studies of American communication habits finding that "texting is the dominant way of communicating for Americans under 50" (Newport 2014; Howe 2015) , a new startup named Texteraction has developed a smart phone service enabling subscribers to use text communication as a replacement for in-person interactions. When the Texteraction app is active, profile pictures of other users located within speaking range of one another will appear on the app's "nearby" list for each user. Selecting a nearby subscriber will send a "texteraction request" to that person's phone which, if accepted, will then initiate a text session between the two parties. The startup selects a small town of N = 1,000 residents as its initial market and restricts membership to those citizens. The startup plans for three phases: (i) a trial period (during which citizens are not charged for the service) for parameter estimation, (ii) a subsidy period to drive the subscriber base to critical mass, and (iii) full unsubsidized service deployment.
Parameter estimation. The objective of the trial period is to enable the startup to estimate the service externality parameter, e, and the town's affinity distribution, F A . All N citizens participate in the trial, which is conducted over a period of T 1 = 10 weeks, with one week per stage. In week t ∈ {1, . . . ,T 1 } the "nearby" list for citizen i is restricted to only show nearby citizens listed in a randomly selected subset I i,t ⊆ [N ] of size |I i,t | = tN /T 1 , that is, a random subset of size 100 in week one, with the size increasing by 100 in each week, until in the last week each citizen has access to all N citizens. At the beginning of the first week, and then at the end of each week of the trial, the users are asked to rate the app, with each rating intended to reflect their perceived value or utility of the service. The ratings are collected in the N × (T 1 + 1) matrix z = (z i,t ), with entry z i,t the app rating by citizen i in week t of the trial (z i,0 the initial rating). Suppose user utility is linear and obeys Metcalfe's law, with some noise incurred in reporting the utility. That is, we assume the ratings take the form z i,t ≡ A i + ex t + ϵ i,t , where A i the (unknown) natural affinity for the service by citizen i, x t = t/T 1 (with x 0 = 0) the (known) fraction of the subscriber base in week t, e the (unknown) externality effect, and ϵ i,t ∼ N (0, σ ϵ ) a sequence of iid (in both i and t) random variables (unknown) capturing the error or noise between the "true" utility and the user's rating.
The externality effect in week t ∈ [T 1 ] for user i ∈ [N ], is estimated via a standard slope estimator, that is,
under the model assumption. The estimate of e by user i is defined asê i ≡ 1 T 1 t ∈[T 1 ]êi,t , and the telescoping error terms yieldê i = e + (ϵ i,T 1 − ϵ i,0 ). The user average is defined asê ≡ 1 N i ∈[N ]êi and may be computed to equalê = e + 1
2/N σ ϵ ), and thusê is an unbiased and consistent estimator of e.
The user affinity distribution F A is also measured from z,
with д(N ,T 1 ) = (1 + 1/T 1 ) 2 /(2N ) + 1/T 1 . One might therefore expect the estimator to perform adequately in estimating A i provided the coefficient of variation is sufficiently small, that is, the estimator may perform poorly for users with small natural affinity A i . The empirical distributionF A from (Â i , i ∈ [N ]) estimates the affinity distribution F A .
The weekly cloud hosting and cellular provider data sharing costs associated with dynamically maintaining each user's "nearby" list are found to scale linearly with the number of users at a cost of $1.50 per user. The management elects to employ a paid subscription model, passing these costs to the users, that is, c = 1.5. The empirical affinity estimate distributionF A and the estimate e are used to estimate the equilibriumx
Simulations of the trial period, and its measurements and estimates, were performed. Set e = 2 and let A i ∼ Uni[0, 1] be iid in i ∈ [N ]. Note x • = 1/2 from Equation (27). We considered three different measurement noise levels σ ϵ = {1, 1/2, 1/4}, yielding estimatesê = {1.975, 1.972, 2.006} andx • = {0.500, 0.497, 0.500}, respectively, and empirical user affinity approximation distributionŝ F A shown in Figure 12 . The accuracy ofF A improves as σ ϵ is reduced, with errors in estimating small or large affinities more pronounced than for estimating intermediate affinities, as expected. We omit due to space constraints a discussion of the estimate of γ . As accurate measurements of e and F A are seen to be possible, we henceforth assume γ , e, F A are now known.
Subsidized deployment. The management uses knowledge of c, e, x • , F A , γ to evaluate the hypothetical performance of various subsidies. The time unit is set at a week, the time slot duration is set at a day (h = 1/7), and the subsidy phase is set to last for at most T = 90 days. The value of γ is set at 1/4, corresponding to users waiting 28 days, on average, between subscription reassessments (cf. Appendix B). The goal of a subsidy is to reach the fractional adoption levelx • = 1/2, corresponding to n • = Nx • = 500 adopters, at which point a subsidy will terminate, and the app will be self-sustaining at the nominal operating cost of c per user per week. A randomly selected initial set of n 0 = 100 (x 0 = n 0 /N = 0.1) adopters are identified before the start of the subsidy period. The actual duration of a subsidy u is defined ast
Four different types of subsidies are considered, with simulation results summarized in Figure 13 . First, six different constant subsidies with subsidy v while
, are evaluated, with v ∈ {$0.35, $0.40, $0.45, $0.60, $1.00, $1.40}. Note v is the subsidy of the weekly cost c but is adjusted daily, and subscribed users in day t are charged a daily cost of h(c − u t ). As evident from the plots, v ∈ {$0.35, $0.40} is insufficient to change the adoption level, v = $0.45 is on the boundary and depending uon the realization may or may not achieve x • by T = 90, while v ∈ {$0.60, $1.00, $1.40} are sufficient to achieve the target. There is clearly little incentive to choose v = $1.40 over v = $1.00. The (J ,t ) scatter plot shows a tradeoff in (J ,t ) between v ∈ {$0.60, $1.00}.
Second, six TTAS subsidies were studied, with χ ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}, and χ = 1.0 the QAS. The effect of χ on u t is shown in the left plot, with higher χ yielding a shorter duration t to reach n • (middle plot), and the (J ,t ) scatter plot showing χ = 1 (QAS) superior to both χ ∈ {0.50, 0.75} in both J (slight) andt (significant). Third, three different AQAS subsidies were studied, with k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and the QAS (χ = 1) included for contrast. The intermediate adoption levels were chosen to be w * 1 ≈ 0.336 for k = 1, w = {7/30, 11/30} for k = 2, and w = {2/10, 3/10, 4/10} for k = 3 (the latter two schedules chosen to divide [x, x • ] into k + 1 equal intervals. The AQAS achieve adoption levels and (t, J ) tradeoffs comparable to that of the QAS, with the scatter plot showing smaller values of k incurring a slight increase in J , on average.
The management elects the AQAS with k = 2, budgeting $600-800 for the cost of the subsidy, and anticipates reaching n • = 500 customers within around three weeks.
LIMITATIONS
The previous section has outlined a possible methodology by which the fundamental model parameters, that is, the externality, cost, and population affinity distribution, could conceivably be estimated through a suitable measurement campaign. Although the measurement campaign we have described is feasible, it is not without both economic and econometric difficulties. First, the economic costs, including monetary, labor, and service deployment delay costs, may be substantial and may well be deemed to exceed the value of the information acquired by the measurements. Second, the econometric difficulties are likewise significant, as reliable inference requires synchronization, or at least coordination, of the various cohorts to meaningfully gauge the strength of the externality at the various stages of the experiments. The costs incurred in overcoming the substantial obsctacles required to achieve this synchronization may again be deemed too high by the service provider.
It is worth emphasizing there are two distinct sources of "error" in seeking to apply diffusion adoption models to predict a "real-world" response: parameter error and model error. The measurement campaign described previously seeks to accurately estimate the model parameters, but there is no assurance that the target users will, in all cases, behave in a manner even approximately consistent with the predictions of the diffusion adoption model. Perhaps the most obvious deficiency of the diffusion model is the assumption that the nature of the externality experienced by an individual is dictated primarily by the fraction of the overall population that has adopted the service rather than capturing the influence of adoption on each user through an influence graph, for example, Kempe et al. (2003) , or some related model. 5 The diffusion adoption model, in all its variants, has long held academic interest because of its effective parsimony-it is one of the simplest tractable models capable of capturing most (but surely not all) of the important aspects of "real-world" observed adoption dynamics.
Finally, we mention the practical difficulty in obtaining useful data from real technology deployments to "validate" the model we have described. One of the inherent difficulties in model validation in this context is lack of a control and variable. A control would be a deployment of a service without any subsidy, and a variable would be a deployment of a service with a subsidy. A scientifically rigorous model validation would be best accomplished by measuring the adoption level with and without a subsidy in identical environments. Unfortunately this seems almost impossible in almost any practical setting due to the considerable variability across deployments of services in different target populations.
CONCLUSION
The TTAS allows a cost-and delay-sensitive service provider to efficiently subsidize customer cost to leverage the impact of the externality. A provider focused on delay may consider the special case of the QAS, or, if a finite number of subsidy adjustments are desired, the AQAS. Knowledge of equilibria and their stability is essential to properly set the target adoption level for terminating the subsidy. This requires knowledge of the population's affinity distribution, which may be estimated using a trial, as described in the case study. The joint impact of the externality, service cost, and affinity distribution on adoption delay and aggregate cost motivates careful subsidy design. and solving w (t w ) = 1 for t w gives
Finally, for t > t w the solution is again Equation (45) but with initial condition t = t w and w 0 = 1. Finally, the dynamics for x (t ) are recovered from the solution for w (t ) via x (t ) = (c − w (t ))/e, x = (c − w 0 )/e, and x • in Equation (27).
Proof of Proposition 5.5. See Figure 15 . For any z 0 > 0, the tangent line at point (z 0 , Q (z 0 )) (black circle) to Q (z) (blue curve) is q 1 (z) = −q(z 0 )z + (Q (z 0 ) + q(z 0 )z 0 ) (orange line) with slope −q(z 0 ) and q-axis intercept Q (z 0 ) + q(z 0 )z 0 . The line q 2 (z) = −q(z 0 )z + (1 − Q (z 0 ) − q(z 0 )z 0 ) (green line) is parallel with the q-axis intercept 1 − Q (z 0 ) − q(z 0 )z 0 and tangent to Q (z) at (−z 0 , 1 − Q (z 0 )). The horizontal distance between the lines is
Consider the set of all lines parallel to q 1 (z), parameterized by the horizontal displacement d, denoted L(z 0 ) = {q 1 (z − d ), d ∈ R}, and let X(z 0 , d ) denote the set of intersections of the line q 1 (z − d ) with the curve Q (z). From the figure:
That is, the line q 2 (z) with displacement Δ(z 0 ) is the critical case of displacements with three intersections with Q (z).
Observe the adoption level interval x ∈ [0, 1] implies the reparameterized adoption level z = c − ex ∈ [c − e, e]. From Definition 2.2, the set of equilibria is X = {z : (c − z)/e = Q (z)}; in words, X is the set of intersections of Q (z) with the line segment on the (z, q) plane of slope −1/e connecting the points (c − e, 1) and (c, 0). Observe X ∅ for all (e, c). Observe the one-to-one correspondence between e ∈ [ √ 2π , ∞) and z 0 (e) via z 0 (e) = q −1 (1/e), for q −1 in Equation (32); that is, for any 1/e < 1/ √ 2π there exists a unique z 0 (e) > 0 such that the line q 1 defined by z 0 (e) above has slope −1/e. The line segment (c − z)/e = (−1/e)z + (c/e) with z-axis intercept c will have three intersections with Q (z) iff c lies between the z-axis intercepts of the orange and green lines in Figure 15 , that is, z 0 (e) + Q (z 0 (e)) q(z 0 (e)) < c < z 0 (e) + Q (z 0 (e)) q(z 0 (e)) + Δ(z 0 (e)),
which simplifies to c ∈ (c l (e), c u (e)). Observe that Equations (35) and (48) are related via δ (e) = Δ(z 0 (e)) for z 0 (e) = q −1 (1/e).
Proof of Eqation (36) in Section 6. Time unit. Recall from Remark 2.1 (point (1)) in Section 2.1 that utilities (including affinities) and costs are measured per unit time. For example, if the unit is a week, then A is the inherent value (in dollars) of the service to a user per week and c is the subscription cost (in dollars) over a week. The time unit is not the subscription commitment duration nor the billing period, however, as users are empowered to adjust their subscription decisions on the finer time scale of the time slot, and, moreover, users are assumed to be billed per time slot, as discussed below. Although the time unit is arbitrary, it naturally determines the range of values, that is, the "effective support size," of both the affinity distribution F A and the value of c. In the case of uniformly distributed affinities, A ∼ Uni [a,ā] , this effective support size may naturally be defined asā − a, while in the case of normally distributed affinities, A ∼ N (μ, σ ), the effective support size is naturally defined as σ . As discussed in Section 5, in both these cases there is no loss in generality in scaling the model such that the effective support size is unity: For uniformly distributed affinities, one scales from (a,ā, c , e ) to (0, 1, c, e), and for normally distributed affinities one scales from (μ, σ , c , e ) to (0, 1, c, e). In both these cases, the subsequent analysis identified c = 1 as a critical cost per unit time (with respect to the nature of the equilibria) when the model was scaled to have a unit effective support size. This model scaling corresponds to selecting a time unit.
Discrete-time finite population AD. Let time be slotted, with time (slots) indexed by t ∈ N and of duration h time units per time slot for h < 1. The notion of a time slot is intended to capture the smallest period of time over which users make service subscription decisions. That is, we suppose utilities and costs are measured per unit time, subscription decisions are made per time slot, and there are multiple (1/h) time slots per unit time. We will show that these discrete-time dynamics approach the continuous-time dynamics (1) as h ↓ 0. Continuing the example where the time unit is a week, if the time slot duration is set at one day, then h = 1/7. Consider a (fixed) finite population of N ∈ N potential service subscribers, indexed by i ∈ [N ], with heterogeneous random affinities (per time unit) given by the iid sequence
1] denote the fraction of the population that has chosen to adopt the service for time slot t, with x 0 the (given) initial adoption level and b i,t ∈ {0, 1} the time slot t adoption decision of user i. Thus (x t , t ∈ Z + ) is the discrete-time adoption process. The following steps are assumed to happen at the instant between the end of slot t and the beginning of slot t + 1: -The service controller advertises to the population the value of x t for the (just-ended) time slot t and then computes (on the basis of x t ) and advertises to the population a subsidy level u t +1 (per time unit) for the upcoming time slot. -Each potential user i ∈ [N ] decides whether or not to evaluate his or her current subscription decision by flipping a coin σ i,t +1 ∼ Ber(hγ ) ∈ {0, 1}, for γ ∈ (0, 1/h), with (σ i,t +1 , i ∈ [N ], t ∈ N) iid in both (i, t ). Observe each user waits on average 1/(hγ ) time slots before reassessing her subscription decision, giving the discrete-time AD a time scale of 1/γ time 
Note that the utility estimates are made on the basis of x t and u t +1 , as is natural, and that e has units of dollars per time unit. -The random user subset I t +1 = {i ∈ [N ] : σ i,t +1 = 1} each makes subscription decisions b i,t +1 = 1(V i (x t , u t +1 ) > 0) for the (about to begin) time slot t + 1. -The remaining users [N ] \ I t +1 carry their time t subscription decisions forward to time t + 1, that is, b i,t +1 = b i,t . -The service controller bills all subscribers for the upcoming time slot, that is, those with b i,t +1 = 1, the amount h(c − u t +1 ) for the upcoming time slot t + 1.
Analysis. Under these assumptions, the discrete-time AD is given by Equation (36). As (i) u t +1 is a function of x t , and (ii) x t is in turn a function of b t ≡ (b i,t , i ∈ [N ]), it follows that:
As ( 
For large but finite N , this probability is an approximation of the population average:
with the understanding that the approximation becomes exact in the limit as N ↑ ∞. The above expression may be rearranged as
Observing lim h↓0 (x t +1 − x t )/h =ẋ (t ), we recover the continuous-time AD (1) for large N . For small but finite h, we have an accurate approximation of Equation (1).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author acknowledges Roch Guérin for his helpful assistance on preliminary versions of this work, as well as helpful feedback from the Associate Editor and the three anonymous reviewers.
